

# Structures of Collaboration Spurred by the SCI Regional Planning Grants

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## Executive Summary

The Department of Housing and Urban Development's Sustainable Communities Initiative (SCI) grant program funded 74 regional planning efforts between 2010 and 2015. This innovative grant program encouraged jurisdictions across the country to address regional challenges by building large and inclusive partnerships. This paper examines the impact that regional conditions, particularly racial income inequality, had on the diversity and structures of these partnerships. We found that grantees in regions with higher racial-ethnic income gaps were more likely to address social equity and inclusion by incorporating representational requirements into their governance structure (the "seat at the table" approach). In regions with lower racial income gaps, we observed a high number of consortium signatories, as well as a greater proportion of grantees creating formal structures to address equity and inclusion (the "build a table" approach). These differences support the idea that regions with less inequality often address regional challenges by developing a shared understanding--or epistemic communities--amongst a diverse set of stakeholders.

## Introduction

In 2010, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Transportation joined together for a first of its kind grant program dedicated to promoting collaborative regional planning. The Sustainable Communities Initiative (SCI) funded multijurisdictional planning efforts that addressed "the interdependent challenges of: (1) economic competitiveness and revitalization; (2) social equity, inclusion, and access to opportunity; (3) energy use and climate change; and (4) public health and environmental impact."<sup>1</sup> SCI also placed "a priority on investing in partnerships"<sup>2</sup>, requiring grantees to form consortia of regional partners.

Following the conclusion of these grants in 2015, we sought to evaluate how their formal governance structures incorporated diverse voices. Specifically, we analyzed how the economic and social factors of each grantee region influenced the governance structures produced to fulfill the grant. In their book *Just Growth*, Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor found that "[c]onscious efforts to develop a shared understanding of the region amongst diverse constituencies seems to make a difference for blending imperatives of

equity and growth."<sup>3</sup> They call these diverse constituencies *epistemic communities*. Building upon these ideas, we explore how regional traits, particularly the level of racial income inequality, affected grantees' ability to foster these diverse epistemic communities, which we measured by examining what constituencies were at the table, how grant resources were shared among consortia members, and how grantees included different perspectives in their governance structures.

## Measuring Epistemic Communities

Using processes described in Appendix A, we built databases of regional characteristics and the organizational traits of core partners in each grantee consortium. The first set of variables measured general demographic features and inequality in the region, and included variables such as total population, median income, proportion of the population that identifies as non-white, income and racial segregation, racial income gap, poverty rate, and foreign born population. The racial income gap variable measured the difference in median household income between White households and households of color, expressed as a proportion of median household income for people of color (POC).

The second set of variables were informed by the characteristics, identified in *Just Growth*, of regions that have been able to grow their economies equitably. These variables included the number of higher education institutions, the size of the region's Black and Latino middle class, the degree of jurisdictional fragmentation within a region, and whether the region had a state capital or military base. We also measured a set of economic indicators for each region, including the number firm and employees by sector and the gross domestic product of grantee regions with metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).

To understand the nature of collaboration under the grant, we focused on two aspects: who participated and how that participation was structured. To get a sense of the types of groups involved in the consortia, we gathered the organizational characteristics of each grantee's "core partners". These characteristics included each partner's entity type, budget size, and mission statement. Finally, we analyzed grantee consortia agreements to measure formal collaboration methods.

## Governance Structure

In reviewing consortia agreements, we realized that grantees employed a host of tactics for building shared understanding of regional problems among stakeholders.

3 Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor. *Just growth: Inclusion and Prosperity in America's Metropolitan Regions* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 159.

<sup>1</sup> Department of Housing and Urban Development. *Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA) for HUD's Fiscal Year 2010 Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program*, FR-5396-N-03 (Washington DC, 2015), 68.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

Despite the challenge of measuring inclusive practices with secondary data, we noted some common trends. Using consortia agreements,<sup>4</sup> We developed a governance typology by asking a series of questions about each grantee consortium:

1. Did the consortium goals and objectives simply reiterate the Partnership for Sustainable Communities' six livability principles; go beyond the Livability Principles; or fail to mention Livability Principles or consortium goals at all?
2. Were consortium members eligible for subgrants or subcontracts?
3. Were members paid to participate in the consortium?
4. Were members expected to contribute non in-kind funding to the consortium?
5. Did the agreement have a definition of equity?
6. Did the consortium have a designated seat or representation requirement for equity or public engagement?
7. Did the governance structure include an equity or public engagement committee, working group, or other body?
8. Did the governance structure include a body with open membership?
9. Did the governance structure assign weighted votes to particular members?

4 In cases where formal consortia agreements could not be found, supplemental documents like work plans and final grant reports were used instead to understand the consortium structure.

10. How many tiers were between the highest body and lowest body?
11. How many signatories did the consortium agreement have?
12. How many governance structure bodies (committees, working groups, boards, etc.) did the consortium produce?

Answers to these questions were the *dependent variables* in the regressions we ran to determine the effects of regional factors on consortia governance structures. Some of the variables that were influenced by regional characteristics included: whether consortium members were eligible for subgrants ("subgrantee members"), whether the consortium agreement included a designated seat or representation requirement for equity or public engagement ("equity seat" variable), whether the governance structure included a body to specifically address equity issues or public engagement ("equity body" variable), and the number of bodies (committees, working groups, boards, etc.) in the governance structure.

### Limitations

The limitation of this sort of analysis, however, is that it only shows the formal structures of collaboration, and not the more informal and interpersonal ways that consortia members interacted and operated. Some questions asked in the governance structure database, including whether the consortium agreement had a definition of equity and the number of tiers in each governance structure, were, upon review, not the best questions to ask. Many




Figure 1: SCI grantee regions by racial-ethnic income gap

of the memoranda were clearly committed to including traditionally underrepresented groups, but did not include a definition of the word “equity” itself.

## Analysis

Because of our interest in how regional inequality affected the nature of grantee collaboration, we used the racial-ethnic income gap for each grantee region as the main method for organizing and analyzing our results. This scale ranged from Burlington, Vermont, where the median household income for people of color was slightly higher than White median income, to Clarksdale, Mississippi, where White household income is 124 percent higher than households of color. Grantees were divided into three categories: Lower racial income gaps (which ranged from -0.09 to 0.39), medium racial income gaps (0.4 to 0.69), and high racial income gaps (0.7 to 1.24). Racial income gap correlated with other inequality measures such as racial segregation, Gini coefficients, and poverty rates, but did not strongly correlate with demographic variables like median income and number of jobs. While these indicators offer a quick way to compare relative levels of regional inequality, they by no means capture all the inequities faced by each region.

In reviewing the agreements for each grantee’s consortium, we focused on four elements of inclusive governance practices: consensus decision-making, horizontal versus vertical structures, transparency, and capacity-building. In tracking decision-making, we wanted to see which grantees attempted to achieve consensus amongst their partners. We were also interested in comparing grantees with vertical consortia, which we defined as “top-down” structures of elite decision makers, and grantees with more horizontal, or “bottom-up”, approaches that attempted to involve a large number of constituents. In a similar vein, we sought to measure how transparent the consortia agreements were about which partners held more power and how other organizations could navigate the governance structure. We also wanted to measure the degree to which grantees emphasized and codified capacity building in their formal agreements. Since we could not consistently measure these elements across all the agreements, we chose to highlight notable examples of each theme instead.

*Figure 2: SCI grantees’ equity governance structures by racial income gap*

## Findings


### Governance Structure

SCI grantees built very large collaboratives for the most part. The average SCI consortium had 27 signatories and eight committees. There also appear to be differences in particular governance practices between regions with higher racial income gaps and regions with lower racial income gaps.

### Operationalizing Equity

One of the most striking differences was how grantees operationalized equity in their governance structures. Consortia typically addressed inclusion by either creating an “equity body” or designating an “equity seat”. Equity bodies were committees or working groups designed to address equity issues and/or public participation. Consortia with an “equity seat” required a particular seat or member to represent the interests of a marginalized group or community interests as a whole.

While many grantees had both an equity seat and an equity body, there does appear to be a difference between consortia that treated inclusion as a process and consortia that treated it as a place at the table. For instance, Southern Bancorp Capital Partners, which had the largest racial income gap of all the grantees, made two of its five consortium members solely responsible for engaging with and ensuring benefits for “low-income and other disadvantaged communities.” Sacramento Council of Governments, on the other hand, which is located in a region with a substantial but significantly lower racial income gap, created a social equity working group and commissioned a subgrantee to develop a set of regional equity and environmental justice indicators in partnership with community members and advocacy groups.



As Figure 2 demonstrates, there was a notable difference between how regions with lower racial income gaps incorporated equity into their governance structures and how higher-inequality regions addressed inclusion.

Over a third of grantees in regions with high racial income gaps required one or more members of their consortia to represent the interests of underrepresented communities, as opposed to five percent of consortia in lower inequality areas. In fact, only one grantee in a lower racial income inequality region had an equity seat in its governance structure, and only nine percent of that region's population were people of color. Moreover, a much larger share of consortia in regions with lower racial income gaps had committees expressly committed to equity and/or public engagement.

The fact that grantees with less racial income inequality emphasized processes and working groups over representative approaches to addressing equity could be a reflection of Benner and Pastor's findings that more equitable regions share a commitment to fostering epistemic communities and processes where divergent groups can tackle difficult issues together. The difference in how regions with higher racial income gaps addressed inclusion could also reflect local capacity. If these regions do not have as many groups advocating on behalf of underrepresented communities, then a representative approach may make more sense for the collaboratives. Thus, we hypothesize that a high racial income gap will lead to the treatment of regional equity issues as a seat at the table, rather than addressing these issues by developing epistemic communities.

### Representative Equity

To better understand the decision to address equity and inclusion through representative governance mechanisms, we ran a logistic regression using the regional racial income gap, subgrantee-funding, and regional income segregation as independent variables, to see whether they influenced the dependent "equity seat" variable. The latter measures the incorporation of an equity seat in the governance structure through a simple binary code (1=Yes, 0=No).

Table 1: Influences on Representative Equity

Predictor	B	SE B	e <sup>B</sup>
Subgrantee members	1.95**	0.889	7.04
Racial Ethnic Income Gap	4.13***	1.514	61.93
Income Segregation	-35.01***	15.301	6.22
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.21			
Model X <sup>2</sup> = 14.09			
n = 69			

\*\*\*p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.10

The model significantly predicts why grantees required an "equity seat" in their governance structure, showing that making consortium members eligible for subgrants and the regional racial income gap both have significant and positive effects. The latter has a particularly strong impact on the dependent variable: The higher the racial income gap, the higher the probability that the governance structure includes an equity seat. Income segregation has the opposite relationship: an increase in regional income segregation negatively affects the likelihood that a grantee's governance structure includes an equity seat. This tension undergirds the complex nuances between race and class and how they affect approaches to social inclusion. More research is needed to understand these impacts. One possible explanation is that regions with higher racial income inequality are just beginning to grapple with these issues and default to token representation, while those with more income segregation have greater capacity and an infrastructure of community-based organizations to support the formation of working groups to address equity issues.

### Governance Structure Traits

In addition to equity, grantee consortia size, structure, and financial configuration also differed between regions with higher and lower levels of inequality. Grantees in regions with lower racial income gaps tended to have more consortia signatories on average than those with higher racial income gaps. Grantees in regions with higher racial income inequality also tended to have fewer governance bodies. This smaller number of committees and issue-related working groups could suggest less structural fragmentation and silos. However, it could also be a reflection of smaller consortia sizes and a lack of collaboration.

Fifty-three percent of grantees in high inequality regions



Table 2: SCI governance structure traits by racial-ethnic income gap

	Subgrantee Members <sup>1</sup>	Average	
		Number of Signatories <sup>2</sup>	Number of Bodies
Lower Racial Income Gap	43%	33.2	8.2
Med Racial Income Gap	37%	25.7	9.7
High Racial Income Gap	53%	20.6	5.3
All Regions	42%	26.7	8.4

provided subgrants or subcontracts to members of their consortium, as opposed to 43 percent of grantees overall. This could suggest that there is a greater need to “resource participation” in regions with substantial racial inequality. We saw this trend across very different grantees that had few things in common other than their level of racial income inequality. Franklin Regional Council of Governments, located in an overwhelmingly white and high-income region in Massachusetts, St. Louis, an urban center with a similar Black and White population, and Doña Ana County, a rural, lower-income New Mexico region with a majority Latino population, all had high racial income gaps and offered subgrants to their consortia members.

### Promising Practices

While there was a rich and diverse array of governance structures across the 74 grantees, some especially innovative processes emerged across the four themes we emphasized in our consortia agreement analysis. Since this analysis only captures the formal contractual arrangements established at the beginning of the grant period, further research and interviews are needed to confirm that these practices continued throughout the grant.

### Decision Making

Two regions’ commitment to decision-making by consensus was notable: Baltimore and the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Pine Ridge’s consortium agreement included language that without consensus, decisions would not be made; instead, a note would be made indicating that consensus could not be reached. In fact, the Pine Ridge consortium agreement also stated that the purpose of the consortium was “for the people.” The Baltimore consortium agreement included rules of engagement, requesting respect, honesty, and candor of its members, with particular emphasis on inclusion in the consensus-building process.

### Horizontal and Vertical Structure

The Centralina Council of Governments, based in Charlotte, North Carolina, produced a particularly “top-down” consortium structure. They organized each group narrowly on the expertise and experience of its members. One working group, the Policy Council, was reserved for the CEOs and board members of consortium member organizations and businesses. The Policy Forum, a separate body, was made up of “elected officials and CEOs.” The

Program Forum and Program Council were adjacent bodies staffed by employees of the organizations represented in the Policy Council and Policy Forum. This particular division of management from staff indicated a top-down structure that was unique within the agreements we reviewed. On the other end of the spectrum, Region Five in Central Minnesota had a consortium of over 200 members, all of whom were directly involved in plan content decisions. The working groups also adopted nominal decision making processes, rather than traditional voting, to ensure that every participant’s perspective was heard.

### Transparency

Kansas City’s consortia agreement demonstrated an impressive commitment to transparent practices. They designated the first six months of their initiative for community engagement and developing equitable processes for allocating resources, with the express goal of ensuring that “decision making [is] more transparent and based on a set of agreed upon principles”. Kansas City also had very clear pathways for all stakeholders to get involved in the planning process and advance to higher levels of authority.

### Capacity Building

The Sacramento Area Council of Governments included a participatory process not only for plan design, but also for the evaluation phase, showing a higher commitment to participation methodologies. Like many other grantees, the consortium participants could request a preferred sustainability status to gain more points on applications for future HUD grants, strengthening the capacity of its members. Land-of-Sky Regional Council also built capacity building practices directly into its governance structure, creating a support body between the different tiers of governance to provide technical assistance and analytical skills to facilitate the decision making process.

### Core Partners

The initial results of this analysis suggest a slight increase in the diversity of core partners as inequality in a region increases. The four most common consortium partner types were the public sector, MPOs and COGs, local nonprofits, and universities. Most grantees had partners who did not fit into these buckets, and our typology for core partners included twenty possible categories that ranged from foundations to rural planning organizations. However,

Table 3: SCI grantees' core partner type by racial income gap

	Most Common Partner Type	Second Most Common Partner Type	Third Most Common Partner Type	Fourth Most Common Partner Type
Lower Inequality	Public Sector	MPO/COG	MPO/COG	(none greater than 10 percent)
Medium Inequality	Public Sector	MPO/COG	Local Nonprofit	(none greater than 10 percent)
High Inequality	Public Sector	Local Nonprofit	Public Sector	University

to most clearly elucidate our point, we've chosen to focus on these four entity types.

Across inequality levels, we saw that the public sector, MPOs/COGs, and local nonprofits serving as the most active entities. However, in lower inequality regions, two core partner types dominated, which lessened as inequality increased. In lower inequality regions, the largest type made up, on average, 52 percent of core partners, with the second-largest type making up, on average, 24 percent. Our analysis noted any core partner type that made up at least ten percent of core partner members; however, in lower inequality regions, no entity type other than the public sector, local nonprofits, or MPOs/COGs reached this threshold.

As inequality increased, we saw diversity of entity types also increase (Figure 3). In medium inequality regions, we saw the largest entity type making up, on average, 50 percent of the core partners, and the second-largest entity type making up, on average, 26 percent of the total. We also saw the continued dominance of the public sector, local nonprofits, and MPOs/COGs as core partners.

Figure 3: SCI grantees' core partner membership by racial income gap



In regions with higher racial income gaps, the difference becomes more evident. The largest core partner entity type made up, on average, 45 percent of the core partners, which is the first time a plurality rather than a majority of core partners is dominant.

## Suggestions for Further Research

We recommend research to determine relationships between consortium size, diversity, and capacity with economic and social variables of each grantee region, as well as elements of governance structures developed by the SCI grant that have already been collected. Additional quantitative research would give us an even clearer picture of what variables, particularly market strength and racial and ethnic inequality of each region, affect the sort of consortia that were developed.

In addition, work plans and final reports should be analyzed to measure less formal modes of governance that may have evolved out of the grant process.

## Conclusion

The Sustainable Communities Initiative provided an opportunity for stakeholders across the country to come together and tackle a host of tough regional problems. SCI grantees used many different tactics to develop shared understanding of these issues. We wanted to see how regional conditions affected these dynamics, particularly the consortia governance structure and diversity of the stakeholders. It is difficult to define and analyze a concept like epistemic communities through secondary data, and our research leaves out the important aspect of informal and interpersonal collaboration that can only be determined through qualitative work. Our research also focuses on

the initiation of the grants, and therefore misses how these structures evolved throughout the planning process.

In spite of these limitations, initial research strongly suggests that a region's level of racial inequality influenced its approach to formal collaboration under the SCI grant. Regions with greater racial income gaps were more likely to address equity and inclusion by incorporating representational requirements into their governance structure (the "seat at the table" approach). In regions with lower racial income gaps, we observed a higher number of consortium signatories, as well as a greater proportion of grantees creating formal structures to address equity and inclusion (the "build a table" approach). These differences support Benner and Pastor's findings that regions with less inequality often address regional challenges by developing a shared understanding amongst a diverse set of stakeholders.

Regions with higher racial income gaps were also more likely to "resource participation" by including subgrantees in their consortia or providing grant funding to their consortia members, suggesting that grantees' likelihood of forming epistemic communities could also be tied to local capacity. Future grant programs that wish to foster equitable development in high inequality regions will need to address these unique challenges to fostering epistemic communities if they are to "blend the imperatives of equity and growth."<sup>5</sup>

Regardless of their relative indicators, all grantees have a long road ahead of them as they begin to address structural racism and inequality in their regions. SCI helped jumpstart this process by encouraging jurisdictions across the country to develop inclusive governance practices. While these collaborations ultimately reflected the conditions of the regions themselves, lessons can be learned from many of the grantees' innovations.

## Appendix A: Methodology

### Geographies

We defined the grantee region as the counties associated with each grantee, which we obtained from the Grantee GIS Shapefiles file on the HUD SCI website.<sup>6</sup> We also assigned one core based statistical area (CBSA) to each grantee. We did this by linking the list of grantee counties to a CBSA to county crosswalk,<sup>7</sup> which we then reconciled with the

grantee MSA designation from HUD's Grantee Information Table. When there were discrepancies, preference was generally given to HUD's MSA designation.

### Demographics and Just Growth

The Just Growth variables included the number of higher education institutions, the size of the region's Black and Latino middle class, the degree of jurisdictional fragmentation within a region, and whether the region had a state capital or military base. With the exception of the number of higher education institutions, we aggregated all of the variables by grantee county. We obtained the number of Department of Defense Installations by linking the Military Installation Database to the grantee geographies using FIPS codes from a HUD-USPS Zip County Crosswalk.<sup>8</sup>

We defined jurisdictional complexity as the number of municipalities and towns per 10,000 people.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, we calculated service district complexity by dividing the total number of non-school district special purpose governments by the county population.<sup>10</sup>

We obtained the number of middle-class Black and Latino households, defined as households identifying as Black or African American alone or Hispanic or Latino, from the American Community Survey (ACS).<sup>11</sup> We defined the total number of middle class households as the number of households that fell into income groups between two-thirds and twice the median household income of each county.<sup>12</sup>

We calculated the number of higher education institutions in each grantee region by spatially joining the US Department of Education's database of accredited post-secondary institutions and programs from December 2015 (geocoded using ArcGIS World Geocode Service), to the SCI Regional Program Grants shapefile provided by HUD.

We applied a similar methodology to our Demographic and Inequality variables. We calculated the total regional population and racial and ethnic makeup by summing the county-level 2010 Census data for each grantee. We aggregated median household income<sup>13</sup> with a weighted average using the total number of households.<sup>14</sup> We pulled Gini coefficients from the ACS and aggregated them using the total population variable. The ACS provided regional

5 Chris Benner and Manuel Pastor. *Just growth: Inclusion and Prosperity in America's Metropolitan Regions* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 159.

6 <https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sci-program-information.html>

7 U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division; Office of Management and Budget, February 2013 delineations

8 HUD-USPS CBSA-County Crosswalk, Q4 2014

9 2012 Census of Government, Table ORG013 (Local Governments in Individual County)

10 Ibid.

11 ACS 2014 5-Year Estimate, Tables B19001B and B19001I

12 ACS 2014 5-Year Estimates, B19013

13 ACS 2014 5-Year Estimates, Table B19001

14 Ibid.

poverty rates and fraction foreign-born,<sup>15</sup> which we weighted using the total estimates from the source data universe.

We obtained Income Segregation and Racial Segregation indices from the Equality of Opportunity Project website.<sup>16</sup> The racial segregation measure is a Theil's H multigroup entropy index, which is a zero to one scale, where one represents complete segregation and zero represents fully integrated neighborhoods. We calculated both variables using data from 2000; for this analysis we assume that segregation patterns have remained constant through the 2000s.

Our racial income gap variable is the difference in median household income between White households and households of color, expressed as a proportion of median household income for people of color (POC).<sup>17</sup> We calculated the combined POC median household income for each county using a weighted average formula.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, we aggregated the White and POC median household incomes for each grantee region using the total number of White households and households of color as a weight.<sup>19</sup>

## Regional Industry

The regional economy indicators are from the 2010 economic census.<sup>20</sup> We used county-level data at the two-digit National Industry Classification code level to account for the total number of establishments and paid employees in each region by industry. At the MSA level, we used data from the Bureau of Economic Labor to determine market strength by GDP, as well as the proportion of public to private GDP for 2010. GDP information is only available for the grantee regions that have MSAs, so this data reflects 63 of the 74 grantee regions.

## Core Partners

We used a combination of sources to build the core partner database. We defined “core partners” through a close-out

<sup>15</sup> ACS 2014 5-Year Estimates, Tables S1701 and B05001, respectively

<sup>16</sup> Chetty and Hendren: Causal Effects, Mobility Estimates and Covariates by County, CZ and Birth Cohort; Online Table IV: Complete County Level Dataset

<sup>17</sup> ACS 2014 5-Year Estimates, Tables B19013B-B19013I and B19001-B19001I

<sup>18</sup> Weighted by number of households

<sup>19</sup> ACS 2014 5-Year Estimates, Tables 19001-19001I

<sup>20</sup> 2010 Census, Table BP00A1. Because most projects began in 2011 and 2012, we chose 2010 to represent conditions at the onset of the project.

database provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that listed a selection of partners for each grantee consortium. This “core partner” list is less extensive than another database maintained by HUD, which includes both core partners and consortium agreement signatories. For the purpose of this initial analysis, we focused on the the first database of nearly one thousand core partners.

For each of these partners, we gathered a series of variables: their entity type, which we defined as the stakeholder group that the partner represented; budget; and mission statement. For entity type, we developed a typology of twenty categories, which are listed in Table 4. For budget, we preferred to use 2014 gross revenue; however, for many partners, this was not possible to determine, and instead we used the budget from the most recent year available. For partners that were no longer operational, we used information from their last year of operation. Content analysis of mission statements determined whether language on the “three Es” of sustainability (the economy, the environment, and equity) was present.

*Table 4: Core Partner Typology*

Business Council	Joint MPO-COG
City	Native American Nation
Council of Governments (COG)	Nonprofit (Local)
County	Nonprofit (National)
Foundation	Nonprofit (Other)
Government Authority	Private
Government (Other)	Quasi-Governmental Agency
Individual	Rural Planning Organization
Joint City-County Government	State
Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO)	University

## Limitations

This initial analysis was performed with an incomplete database of 1,000 of the total 2,500 partners for every SCI grantee. We chose not to merge the core partners database with the larger database for this reason, and it is important to note that this is an initial, and by no means definitive, descriptive analysis of SCI consortia.

There were two grantees that did not have core partners provided by HUD, and these were eliminated from the analysis. Additionally, it was not possible to find information on some core partners that were listed; when that happened, those were also eliminated from the analysis. Each grantee's definition of “core partner” appeared to be different. For this reason, the larger consortium database should be used for more rigorous analysis.

## Appendix B: Additional Figures

Figure 4: SCI grantee regions by proportion of residents of color




Table 5: SCI grantee regional inequality indicators by racial income gap

	Average			
	Racial Income Gap	Gini Coefficient	Income Segregation	Racial Segregation
Lower Racial Income Gap	0.30	0.46	0.08	0.15
Med Racial Income Gap	0.54	0.46	0.09	0.22
High Racial Income Gap	0.83	0.48	0.09	0.28
All Regions	0.55	0.46	0.09	0.22

Figure 5: SCI grantee regional population by racial income gap




Figure 6: SCI grantee median income by racial income gap

